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No hay evidencia para la importancia del orden; por tanto el orden no importa: Una 
apelación a la ignorancia 
Resumen.  
Dentro del limitado campo de investigación sobre el conocimiento probabilístico del profesor, las 
respuestas incorrectas, inconsistentes o incluso inexplicables se explican frecuentemente usando 
marcos teóricos basados en las heurísticas y el razonamiento informal. Más recientemente ha emergido 
nueva investigación basada en falacias lógicas, que se ha mostrado efectiva para explicar ciertas 
respuestas normativamente incorrectas a tareas probabilísticas. Este artículo contribuye a esta área 
emergente, mostrando como una particular falacia lógica conocida como “apelación a la ignorancia” 
es útil para explicar un conjunto de respuestas normativamente incorrectas de profesores de 
matemática de enseñanza primaria y secundaria en formación a una nueva tarea probabilística. 
También se sugiere que el foco sobre el enfoque clásico en la enseñanza de la probabilidad teórica 
contribuye al uso de esta falacia en particular. 
Palabras clave: Cognición; Falacias; Probabilidad; Conocimiento probabilístico; Profesores en 
formación. 
 
Não há evidência de que a ordem seja importante; por isso, a ordem não importa: um apelo à 
ignorância 
 Resumo 
 No limitado campo de investigação sobre o conhecimento probabilístico dos professores, as 
respostas incorretas, inconsistentes e até mesmo inexplicáveis às tarefas probabilísticas são mais 
frequentemente explicadas pela utilização de teorias, estruturas e modelos baseados no raciocínio 
heurístico e informal. Mais recentemente, o surgimento de nova investigação baseada em falácias 
lógicas tem-se mostrado eficaz para explicar certas respostas normativamente incorretas a tarefas 
probabilísticas. Este artigo contribui para essa área emergente de investigação, demonstrando como 
uma falácia lógica particular, conhecida como "um apelo à ignorância", pode ser usada para explicar 
um conjunto específico de respostas normativamente incorretas dadas por futuros professores de 
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matemática do ensino básico e secundário a uma nova tarefa de probabilidades. Sugere-se ainda que o 
foco na abordagem clássica para o ensino da probabilidade teórica contribui para o uso desta falácia 
lógica particular. 
 Palavras-chave: Cognição; Falácias; Probabilidades; Conhecimento probabilístico; Futuros 
professores. 
 
There is no evidence for order mattering; therefore, order does not matter: An appeal to 
ignorance 
Abstract.  
Within the limited field of research on teachers’ probabilistic knowledge, incorrect, inconsistent 
and even inexplicable responses to probabilistic tasks are most often accounted for by utilizing theories, 
frameworks and models that are based upon heuristic and informal reasoning. More recently, the 
emergence of new research based upon logical fallacies has been proving effective in explaining certain 
normatively incorrect responses to probabilistic tasks. This article contributes to this emerging area of 
research by demonstrating how a particular logical fallacy, known as “an appeal to ignorance,” can be 
used to account for a specific set of normatively incorrect responses provided by prospective elementary 
and secondary mathematics teachers to a new probabilistic task. It is further suggested that a focus on 
the classical approach to teaching theoretical probability contributes to the use of this particular logical 
fallacy.  
Keywords: Cognition; Fallacies; Probability; Probabilistic Knowledge; Prospective Teachers. 
 
Il n’y a pas d’évidence que l’ordre importe ; alors, l’ordre n’importe pas : Un appel à 
l’ignorance 
Résumé. 
Dans le domaine limité de la recherche sur la connaissance des enseignants au sujet de la 
probabilité, des réponses incorrectes, inconsistantes et même inexplicables à des tâches probabilistes 
sont le plus souvent expliqués par le raisonnement heuristique et informel. Plus récemment, de nouvelles 
recherches basées sur les erreurs logiques se montrent efficaces pour expliquer certaines réponses 
incorrectes à des tâches probabilistes. Cet article contribue dans ce domaine de recherche émergente 
en démontrant comment une certaine erreur logique, connue sous le nom d’« appel à l’ignorance, » 
peut être utilisée pour expliquer un ensemble spécifique de réponses incorrectes fournies par de futurs 
enseignants du primaire et du secondaire à une nouvelle tâche probabiliste. On suggère aussi que 
l’accent mis sur l’approche classique d’enseigner la probabilité théorique contribuerait à l’emploi de 
cette erreur logique. 
Mots-clés : Cognition ; Erreurs logiques ; Probabilité ; Connaissance probabiliste ; Futurs enseignants 
 
1. Introduction 
With some notable exceptions (e.g., Gómez, Batanero, & Contreras, 2013), there 
has been relatively little research to date on (prospective) teachers’ probabilistic 
knowledge (Jones, Langrall, & Mooney, 2007; Stohl, 2005).  The objective of this 
article, in general, is to contribute to this domain. More specifically, this article aims to 
contribute to the well-established domain of research that accounts for (through 
various theories, models and frameworks) incorrect, inconsistent, and sometimes 
inexplicable responses to a range of probabilistic tasks (Abrahamson, 2009; Chernoff, 
2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Konold, 1989; Konold, Pollatsek, Well, Lohmeier, 
& Lipson, 1993; LeCoutre, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974).  
To meet the general and specific objectives stated, a group of prospective teachers 
were asked to determine and justify which of two student responses provided the 
correct answer and explanation to a question that involved determining the probability 
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that a three-child family has two daughters and one son. In addition to contributing a 
twist to a task recently introduced to the research literature, we also utilize a unique 
lens to account for certain responses to that task. In our analysis, we demonstrate that 
logically fallacious reasoning—more specifically, an appeal to ignorance (there is no 
evidence for p; therefore, not-p)—accounts for certain prospective teachers’ 
normatively incorrect responses to the task. By meeting the general and specific 
objectives presented, this article will contribute to the area of research (Chernoff, 
2012a; Chernoff & Russell, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b) that suggests that fallacious 
reasoning, taken here to mean the use of logical fallacies, can account for certain 
normatively incorrect responses to probabilistic tasks. 
 
2. A brief summary of prior research 
Research into probabilistic thinking and the teaching and learning of probability 
has largely focused on incorrect responses to probability tasks. (It must be noted that 
the focus on incorrect responses does not, in any way, suggest a negative view of the 
mind [see, for example, Kahneman, 2011]). Many theories, models, and frameworks 
have, traditionally, accounted for normatively incorrect responses to probabilistic tasks 
within the field of mathematics education. More recently, a new area of research 
suggests that the use of logical fallacies can account for certain normatively incorrect 
responses to probabilistic tasks. In the following section, we provide a brief overview 
of the research in this area to date; for an in-depth survey of research related to 
probabilistic intuition and difficulties associated with learning probability, see 
Batanero, Chernoff, Engel, Lee, and Sanchez (2016). 
 
2.1. Heuristic and informal reasoning 
In the early 1970s, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman ran a series 
of studies that led them to conclude that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic 
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting 
values to simpler judgmental operations” (1974, p. 1124). In particular, based on the 
results from multiple surveys that asked individuals to compare sequences of random 
events (like flipping a coin), they noted that “people expect that the essential 
characteristics of the process will be represented, not only globally in the entire 
sequence, but also locally in each of its parts” (1974, p. 1125). This type of reasoning 
was denoted the representativeness heuristic: whereby one “evaluates the probability 
of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) similar in essential 
properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by 
which it is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, p. 431). For example, when 
considering a sequence of tosses of a coin, Tversky and Kahneman found that subjects 
deemed the sequence HTHTTH was more likely to occur than HHHHTH (where H 
stands for “heads” and T stands for “tails”) because the ratio of the number of heads to 
the number of tails was not close enough to one.  
As part of their research, Kahneman and Tversky also identified what they 
considered to be the root cause of the representativeness heuristic, heuristic reasoning, 
and individuals’ intuitive notion of randomness: “people’s intuitions about random 
sampling appear to satisfy the law of small numbers, which asserts that the law of large 
numbers applies to small numbers as well” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, p. 106) and, 
further, “this belief [in the law of small numbers] […] underlies the erroneous 
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intuitions about randomness, which are manifest in a wide variety of contexts” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, p. 433). As Chernoff and Russell (2012a) explain, the 
representative heuristic, at the time, provided a new model for interpreting normatively 
incorrect responses to comparisons of relative probability, and as a result, heuristic 
reasoning became a dominant lens for research investigating comparisons of relative 
probability. 
Since the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970s, a number of 
researchers have addressed issues associated with the inferential nature of Tversky and 
Kahneman’s research. For instance, as Shaughnessy (1992) notes, “there was no 
attempt made [by Tversky and Kahneman] to probe the thinking of any of these 
subjects” (p. 473). Consequently, Shaughnessy (1977) brought two new elements to 
the task. First, “the subjects were asked to supply a reason for each of their responses. 
In this way it was possible to gain some insight into the thinking process of the 
subjects as they answered the questions” (p. 308). Second, in comparing the chances of 
occurrence of different sequences, Shaughnessy’s iteration provided students with the 
option of “about the same chance” (p. 309) as one of the forced response items. The 
results of Shaughnessy’s work, by and large, echoed the results of work by Tversky 
and Kahneman, even though the “about the same chance” option was unavailable to 
the participants Tversky and Kahneman’s studies. However, with the new justification 
element of the task, Shaughnessy was able to determine that subjects did, in fact, find 
that a sequence such as BBBGGG (where B stands for “boy” and G for “girl,” with the 
sequence representing birth order) was not representative of (the expected) randomness 
and that the sequence BBBBGB was not representative of the (expected) ratio of boys 
to girls.  
The research of Lecoutre led to the recognition of another bias, the equiprobability 
bias, that Lecoutre suggested be “added to the list of biases observed in various 
situations of uncertainty” (1992, p. 558). This research was based on interpreting 
comparative probability task responses that involved a relationship between 
randomness and equiprobability. As Lecoutre (1992) found, some individuals seem to 
believe that random events are equiprobable “by nature” (p. 557), or, conversely, 
misconstrue equiprobability as the notion that “anything can happen” (Chernoff, 
2012a, p. 80). For example, when a piece of candy is drawn from a box containing two 
orange flavored pieces and one lemon flavored piece, the events “draw a lemon-
flavored piece” and “draw an orange-flavored piece” may be considered equally likely 
by some individuals because the process is random, and thus “the two results to 
compare are equiprobable because it is a matter of chance” (Lecoutre, 1992, p. 561). 
The equiprobability bias has accounted for certain normatively incorrect responses in 
more recent studies (e.g., Chernoff, 2012a). 
During the same period of time, Konold and colleagues (1993), building upon 
Shaughnessy’s (1977) task modifications (i.e., including an equally likely response 
option and asking for a response justification), introduced a different version of the 
relative probability task (e.g., more than two sequences were provided to choose from) 
than had been seen in the past. Further, the researchers gave students a “Which is most 
likely?” version of the task followed by a “Which is least likely?” version of the same 
task. They found that, for the most likely version, certain participants answered using 
the outcome approach—“a model of informal reasoning under conditions of 
uncertainty” (Konold, 1989, p. 59)—according to which the participants interpreted the 
question as asking them to predict what will actually happen instead of taking 
probability into consideration. For the least likely version, researchers found the 
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representativeness heuristic model to be applicable, as was the case with Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1972) research. The outcome approach became, as had the 
representativeness heuristic earlier, a new way to account for incorrect responses to 
comparisons of relative probability. As a result, Konold’s notion of informal reasoning 
also became a dominant lens for research investigating comparisons of relative 
probability. 
 
2.2. Logically fallacious reasoning  
More recently, a slowly growing area of research suggests that fallacious 
reasoning, more specifically, the use of logical fallacies, can account for certain 
normatively incorrect responses to probabilistic tasks. For example, Chernoff and 
Russell (2011b, 2012a) demonstrated that certain prospective mathematics teachers, 
when asked to identify which event (a.k.a., outcome or subset of the sample space) 
from five flips of a fair coin was least likely to occur, instead of utilizing the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), the outcome approach 
(Konold, 1989) or the equiprobability bias (Lecoutre, 1992). Instead, they employed a 
particular logical fallacy, the fallacy of composition: when an individual infers 
something to be true about the whole based upon truths associated with parts of the 
whole. Specifically, Chernoff and Russel found that participants incorrectly deemed 
that the events were equally likely by following a particular line of reasoning: namely, 
the coins (i.e., the parts) are equiprobable; the events (i.e., the whole) are comprised of 
coins; therefore, the events are equiprobable (which is not necessarily true). It should 
be noted that use of the fallacy of composition accounted for both normatively correct 
and incorrect responses to the relative probability comparison task. In doing so, new 
light was shed on a subset of the answers that would have, traditionally, been 
accounted for with Lecoutre’s equiprobability bias. 
In subsequent research, Chernoff (2012a) and Chernoff and Russell (2011a) 
applied the fallacy of composition to a more traditional relative probability 
comparison. Prospective mathematics teachers were asked to determine which of five 
possible coin flip sequences, rather than events, were least likely to occur. As was the 
case in their prior research (e.g., Chernoff & Russell, 2011b), the fallacy of 
composition accounted for normatively incorrect responses to the task. More 
specifically, the researchers demonstrated that participants referenced the 
equiprobability of the coin, noted that the sequence is comprised of flips of a fair coin 
and, as such, fallaciously determined that the sequence of coin flips should also have a 
heads-to-tails ratio of one to one. In other words, the properties associated with the fair 
coin (the parts), which make up the sequence (the whole), are expected in the 
sequence. Once again, the fallacy of composition, instead of traditional theories, 
models, and frameworks associated with heuristic and informal reasoning, accounted 
for certain normatively incorrect responses to a probabilistic task.  
A unique advantage of this new interpretation of certain normatively incorrect 
responses is that it avoids certain assumptions about individuals’ understanding of the 
law of large numbers. While the work of Tversky and Kahneman suggested that the 
law of small numbers—an application to small numbers of the law of large numbers, 
which “guarantees that very large samples will indeed be highly representative of the 
population from which they are drawn" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, p. 106)—was 
related to the representativeness heuristic, subsequent  research (e.g., Evans & Pollard, 
1981; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Stohl, 2005) has demonstrated that individuals do not 
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always have a proper understanding of the law of large numbers. Consequently, as 
Chernoff and Russell (2012a) recognized, the assumption that when individuals appear 
to be employing the law of small numbers, they have an appropriate understanding of 
the law of large numbers to make such an application, is worthy of note. On the other 
hand, the fallacy of composition framework, which was demonstrated to account for 
normatively incorrect responses to relative probability comparisons that, previously, 
may have been accounted for by the representativeness heuristic, avoids said note 
worthy issue.  
Chernoff and Russell (2011a, 2011b, 2012a) contend, based on their research 
utilizing the fallacy of composition, that they have opened or reopened a new area of 
investigation for those researching probabilistic thinking and the teaching and learning 
of probability. They also suggest that more research will allow individuals to 
determine to what extent informal logical fallacies and fallacious reasoning can 
account for normatively incorrect responses to a variety of probabilistic tasks. The 
former and latter contentions provided the motivation (and research question) to 
determine whether or not any another logical fallacy, namely an appeal to ignorance, 
can account for normatively incorrect responses to a probabilistic task that has recently 
been introduced to the research literature.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
A logical fallacy is, in simplest terms, an error in reasoning. In general, a logical 
fallacy occurs when the premise(s) of an argument are not sufficient to support the 
conclusion. Of the numerous fallacies that could potentially be utilized as a theoretical 
framework (e.g., equivocation, begging the question, the fallacy of composition, the 
fallacy of division, and others), the analysis of the results of the present study will rely 
on one particular logical fallacy: namely, an appeal to ignorance, which is “an 
argument for or against a proposition [p] on the basis of a lack of evidence against or 
for it” (Curtis, 2011, para. 3).  
An appeal to ignorance can come in one of two forms: (1) there is no evidence 
against p, therefore, p, and (2) there is no evidence for p, therefore, not-p. Stated in 
more colloquial terms, the two cases of the fallacy can be described as follows: (1) the 
lack of evidence against a proposition is perceived as evidence that the proposition is 
true, and (2) the lack of evidence for a proposition is perceived as evidence that the 
proposition is false. As an example, consider the following question: Is there a lawn 
mower in my garage? If one does not look inside the garage, the lack of evidence 
against the existence of a lawn mower in my garage does not amount to evidence for 
its existence, because there may not be a lawn mower in my garage; this is the first 
form of an appeal to ignorance. On the other hand, the lack of evidence for the 
existence of a lawn mower in my garage does not amount to evidence of its absence, 
because there may, in fact, be a lawn mower in my garage; this is the second form of 
an appeal to ignorance.  
Although the previous example may seem contrived, this fallacy is, in fact, quite 
common in everyday life. For instance, some people believe that a large and unusual 
type of animal (often called the Loch Ness monster) inhabits Loch Ness in the Scottish 
Highlands. While there is no evidence that the animal exists, there is also no 
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conclusive evidence that it does not exist1. People may reason (fallaciously) about this 
absence of evidence in two different ways. In particular, for some, the absence of 
evidence against the existence of the Loch Ness monster acts as proof of its existence. 
This is the first form of the appeal to ignorance fallacy: there is no evidence against p 
(no one can prove unequivocally that Loch Ness does not exist), therefore p (Loch 
Ness exists, just beyond the grasp of our exploration). On the other hand, others 
interpret the lack of evidence for the existence of the Loch Ness Monster as proof of its 
non-existence, which is the second form of the fallacy: there is no evidence for p (no 
one has found unequivocal evidence that Loch Ness exists), therefore not-p (Loch Ness 
does not exist). 
To give yet another example, if a drug has been subjected to numerous tests for 
harmful effects and none have been discovered, some may conclude that the lack of 
evidence that the drug is harmful (there is no evidence for p) is proof that the drug is 
not harmful (therefore not-p). In Western society, this second form of the fallacy is 
often rationalized and accepted, especially in scientific domains: as Curtis (2011, para. 
14) writes, “when extensive investigation has been undertaken, it is often reasonable to 
infer that something is false based upon a lack of positive evidence for it.” However, 
the acceptance of this fallacy does not negate the fact that it is indeed a fallacy—a 
point that, we acknowledge, is debated in certain cases, such as in the aforementioned 
case of drug testing. At best, when extensive investigation has been undertaken, a lack 
of evidence suggests that the probability is low that a given proposition is true; 
however, given that such reasoning is inductive rather than deductive, it is not 
conclusive, and therefore does not prove that the given proposition is true (Curtis, 
2011). 
Our analysis of the results of the present study will be concerned with this second 
form of the fallacy: there is no evidence for p, therefore not-p. In other words, our 
attention will focus on a set of individuals utilizing the absence of evidence as 
evidence of absence. Stated in terms of our first example, our analysis of the results 
will focus on those individuals who do not look inside the garage and use the lack of 
evidence of a lawn mower in the garage to fallaciously declare that there is no lawn 
mower in my garage. Of course, the participants in the study are not concerned with 
garages and lawn mowers—rather, they are concerned with whether or not order 
matters for a particular probabilistic task. 
 
4. The Jane or Dianne task 
The Jane or Dianne task, presented below in Figure 1, represents an alteration to 
the original “two boys and a girl task” (Chernoff & Zazkis, 2011, p. 21), which was 
utilized in previous research (ibid.) and introduced by Chernoff and Zazkis (2010). 
 
                                                
1 We do acknowledge the potential impact of a recent photo of the Loch Ness monster taken by Ian 
Bremner in late September, 2016. 
What is the probability that a three-child family has two daughters and one son?  
 
Jane’s explanation: Out of the four possible outcomes (3 daughters, 0 sons; 2 
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Figure 1: The Jane or Dianne Task 
Fundamentally, the two boys and a girl task (Chernoff & Zazkis, 2010) is the same 
as the Jane or Dianne task. In other words, the core of the task—the probability 
question, which is what is the probability that a three-child family has two daughters 
and one son—is the same in both tasks. Previously, the task was utilized in order to 
elicit insight into prospective secondary school mathematics teachers’ pedagogical 
approaches. Said preservice teachers (who had previously studied probability) were 
able to quickly give the normatively correct answer to the two boys and a girl task, and 
thus, were instead presented with the task of describing their pedagogical approach in 
response to a hypothetical student who gave a normatively incorrect answer of the 
probability being one-fourth. Chernoff and Zazkis (2011) suggest a “desirable 
pedagogical approach as one that uses the learner’s ideas as a starting point” (p. 19), 
and their investigations focused on whether the prospective high school mathematics 
teachers’ responses modeled this approach, how these preservice teachers would react 
to such an approach, and how personal experience influenced pedagogical choices.  
In addition to the desirable pedagogical approach, Chernoff and Zazkis (2011) 
introduced the notion of the sample set, defined as “any set of all possible outcomes, 
where the elements of this set do not need to be equiprobable” (p. 18) in order to frame 
their investigation of prospective teachers’ pedagogical responses. They argue that 
students who give the normatively incorrect response of one-fourth to the two boys 
and a girl task are in fact using a legitimate partition of the sample space which 
includes all possible outcomes, i.e. {three boys (BBB), two boys and one girl (BBG, 
BGB, GBB), one boy and two girls (BGG, GBG, GGB), three girls (GGG)}. This 
partition, they contend, is not a mistake, but in fact a useful step in probabilistic 
thinking. The error is made when students assign equal probability to said outcomes, 
rather than asking if, in fact, each outcome they have listed is actually equally likely. 
The study went on to present the preservice teachers with a more challenging 
probability question designed to have them experience what a theoretical tutee might 
experience, and then interact with both the desirable pedagogical approach, as well as 
their own suggested pedagogical approaches, which often included disregarding the 
student’s response, and imposing the correct reasoning.  
In this new version of the task, however, the focus is not on evaluating the 
prospective teachers’ pedagogical responses. Rather, the focus is on which response 
prospective mathematics teachers deem mathematically correct and, relatedly, which 
explanation is deemed appropriate. Possible outcomes were included as justification 
for the responses in Jane and Dianne task, in part, because previous research has 
shown that normatively incorrect solutions do not necessarily point to an absence of 
daughters, 1 son; 1 daughter, 2 sons; and 0 daughters, 3 sons) only one outcome (2 
daughters, 1 son) is favourable, so the probability is one-fourth.  
 
Dianne’s explanation: Out of the eight possible outcomes (daughter, daughter, 
daughter; daughter, daughter, son; daughter, son, daughter; son, daughter, 
daughter; daughter, son, son; son, daughter, son; son, son, daughter; son, son, son) 
only three outcomes (daughter, daughter, son; daughter, son, daughter; son, 
daughter, daughter) are favourable, so the probability is three-eighths  
_______________________ ‘s explanation is correct because..... 
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correct probabilistic reasoning (Abrahamson, 2009; Chernoff, 2009; Chernoff & 
Mamolo, 2015; Konold et. al., 1993). In terms of the original context of the question 
from Chernoff and Zazkis (2011), the Jane and Dianne task gives insight into whether 
or not students are inclined to use a sample set without realizing that not all outcomes 
in the sample set are equally likely. As such, the task has been altered in order to 
contribute to the limited amount of research on what Jones, Langrall, and Mooney 
(2007) called “teachers’ probabilistic knowledge” (p. 933).  
 
5. Participants 
The (n = 130) participants in our research were comprised of 52 (40%) prospective 
elementary school teachers (PESTs) and 78 (60%) prospective secondary school 
teachers (PSSTs). The PESTs were following a methodology course designed for 
teaching elementary school mathematics and the PSSTs were following a methodology 
course designed for teaching secondary school mathematics. The 52 PESTs were 
enrolled in two different classes (each including approximately 25 students); similarly, 
the 78 PSSTs were enrolled in three different classes (each including approximately 25 
students). For both the PEST’s and the PSSTs, the topic of probability had not yet been 
addressed in their course. Instead, content, strategies, and approaches garnered from 
research and practice related to the teaching and learning of probability were addressed 
after the data for this research was collected. To collect the data, participants were 
asked to determine, via written response, which of the two explanations (Jane’s or 
Dianne’s) was correct; and further, to justify their choice, also via written response. 
The participants were given as much time as required to complete the task. 
 
6. Results 
As seen in Table 1 below, there was, roughly, an even split between those 
individuals who declared and explained why Jane’s response was correct and those 
who declared and explained why Dianne’s response was correct. More specifically, 
about half (51%) of the participants declared that Dianne’s explanation was correct: 40 
of the 78 PSSTs (51%) and 26 of the 52 (50%) of the PESTs. Thus, as the data shows, 
there was little difference between the percentage of PESTs and PSSTs that chose 
Dianne and her explanation. Worthy of note, not all 66 of the 130 participants who 
chose the correct response provided an appropriate justification for why Dianne’s 
explanation was correct. [Nine of the participants (7%) chose an option that was not 
presented to them. These individuals either indicated that neither choice and 
explanation was correct or that both of the choices and explanations were correct. 
These individuals have been placed in the ‘Other’ column in Table 1. The responses 
from those individuals who chose Dianne or who fell into the ‘Other’ category will not 
be part of the subsequent analysis of the results.] 
 
Table 1: Numerical results. 
Prospective 
teachers 
n Jane Dianne Other 
Elementary school   52 23 26 3 
Secondary school  78 32 40 6 
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Total  130 55 (42%) 66 (51%) 9 (7%) 
 
Instead, our analysis of the results will focus on the 55 participants (42%) that 
chose Jane and her explanation. More specifically, 23 of the 52 PESTs (44%) and 32 
of the 78 (41%) of the PSSTs chose Jane and her explanation, which, as was the case 
with Dianne, reveals little difference between the percentages associated with the 
PESTs and PSSTs. The 55 total participants who chose Jane and her explanation did 
not have similar justifications for why Jane’s response and explanation was considered 
correct. As such, the 55 responses from those individuals who chose Jane have been 
further categorized in Table 2 below. 
Jane responses were organized into two distinct categories: those responses that 
referenced order and those responses that did not reference order. Of the 55 
participants that chose Jane’s response, 45 (82%) referenced order in their justification 
and 10 (18%) did not reference order in their justification. More specifically, of the 23 
PESTs that chose Jane’s response, 15 (65%) referenced order and 8 (35%) did not 
make reference to order and, of the 32 PSSTs that chose Jane’s response, 30 (94%) 
referenced order in the justifications and 2 (6%) did not reference order in their 
justifications, which represents a departure from the previous even split seen between 
PESTs and PSSTs.  
 
Table 2: Numerical results within Jane responses. 
Prospective teachers 
 
No reference 
to order 
Reference to order 
n No reference 
to question 
Reference to 
question 
Elementary school 23 8 7 8 
Secondary school 32 2 17 13 
Total 55 10 24 21 
 
Refining “Jane” responses a step further, of the 45 people that referenced order in 
their response justifications, 21 individuals (47%) also made reference to the question 
(What is the probability that a three-child family has two daughters and one son?) in 
their response justifications. More specifically, 8 of the 15 PESTs (53%) and 13 of the 
30 PSSTs (43%) referenced both order and the question. The 21 responses referencing 
both order and the question, which represent, concurrently, 16% (21/130) of all 
participants, 38% (21/55) of those who chose Jane’s response and 47% (21/45) of 
those who chose Jane’s response and referenced order in their justifications, are 
featured in the analysis of results. 
 
6.1. Analysis of Results 
Given the consistency associated with all 21 of the responses that referenced both 
order and the question, 5 of the 8 responses from the PESTs and 5 of the 13 responses 
from the PSSTs—10 in total—are presented below for analysis.  
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PESTs Response Justifications  
In what follows, we analyse five exemplary responses from Sam, Rebecca, Carla, 
Ernie and Woody, which all evidence an appeal to ignorance. We begin by considering 
the responses of Carla and Woody. 
Carla: Dianne’s explanation gives possibilities of 2 girls and one boy plus birth order 
possibilities – this is not what the question asked.  
Woody: Dianne reuses some of the possibilities multiple times. GGB is the same as GBG. 
The question is not asking anything about the order in which they were born.  
As the italicized portions of the responses from Carla and Woody show, both 
individuals reference that birth order should not be taken into consideration. On the 
one hand, Woody, declaring that “GGB is the same as GBG,” is implicitly declaring 
that order does not matter. Carla, on the other hand, is more explicit in declaring that 
Dianne’s explanation calculates the possibilities “plus” the birth order, which can be 
interpreted to mean that the order is in addition to what the question is asking. Both 
Woody and Carla, however, are quite clear in declaring why they have concluded that 
birth order does not matter. Essentially, both individuals make it clear that the question 
does not “ask” about the order. As seen in the responses from Sam, Rebecca, and 
Ernie, which are presented below and similarly italicized as above, they, too, reference 
that the question does not “say anything” or “mention” or “never asked” (respectively) 
about birth order.  
Sam: This explanation is better because the question doesn’t say anything about birth 
order. It just wants to know the probability of 2 daughters and 1 son; whether or not 
this occurs as DDS, DSD, or SDD does not matter. I think they have a 1/4 chance of 
the 2 daughters and 1 son outcome.  
Rebecca: There are no repetitions of the number of each sex of child in Jane’s. The 
question doesn’t mention birth order and therefore there is no need to consider that 
GGB and BGG is the same thing in answering this particular question.  
Ernie: The question never asked about order so the only total is assumed and therefore 
needed ~ disregard order patterns so 4 possible outcomes.  
Further, the responses from Sam, Rebecca, and Ernie indicate that there is no need 
to consider birth order or that one can, as stated by Ernie, “disregard the order 
patterns.” Alternatively stated, for all three responses, given that the question does not 
make reference to order mattering, it is concluded that order does not matter, which, 
ultimately, leads to choosing Jane and her explanation as being correct.  
Considered from within an appeal-to-ignorance framework, the responses from 
Sam, Rebecca, and Ernie and, further, from Carla and Woody (and the other 3 PESTs 
who referenced both order and the question in their responses), all note that the 
question does not provide evidence that order matters (i.e., there is no evidence for p) 
and, as a result, conclude that order does not matter (i.e., therefore not-p), which, 
ultimately, grounds a justification for why Jane’s response and her explanation are 
correct. Similar results are found within the responses from the PSSTs. 
 
PSSTs Response Justifications 
In what follows, we analyse five exemplary responses from Frasier, Eddie, Robin, 
Paul and Glen, which also all evidence an appeal to ignorance. We first consider the 
responses of Paul and Eddie.  
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Paul: There are four different combinations that are possible because it didn’t specifically 
say that order mattered. So generally, you can have 2 sons, 1 daughter; 2 daughters, 1 
son; 3 sons; 3 daughters in any order.  
Eddie: There is no specification as to what order the daughters & sons have to be born in. 
Therefore, there is only four possible outcomes causing a one in four chance.  
As seen in the responses from Paul and Eddie, they make reference to the question 
and the fact that it does not specify that order matters. We note that in these particular 
responses, we are inferring that “it” for Paul and “there is no specifications” for Eddie 
are implicit references to the question. Working from this inference, for both Paul and 
Eddie, the reason that there are only four possible outcomes or that the different events 
can happen in any order are predicated on the question not providing evidence that 
order matters. The responses from Frasier, Robin, and Glen, presented below, are more 
explicit in their reference to the question. 
Frasier: The question does not state the order of the siblings matters " they simply want 
a 2 girl + 1 boy family. Dianne has multiples of the same outcome such as DDS, and 
DSD.  
Robin: The question did not ask what the probability is that the family has 2 daughters 
and one son in that order, so there are only 4 possible outcomes.  
Glen: The question does not specify that the order of the children matters, they just want 
2 daughters and a son. It shouldn’t matter what order they come out in. As far as the 
question is concerned, the DDS, DSD, SDD are all the same outcome.  
In fact, the above three responses are quite explicit in declaring that the question 
does not “state,” “ask,” or “specify” that the order of the children matters. Further, and 
working from the notion that the question does not specify that the order matters, all 
three participants conclude that the order does not matter, albeit in different ways (e.g., 
“multiples of the same outcome”; “there are only four possible outcomes”; “DDS, 
DSD, SDD are all the same outcome”). Alternatively stated, for the responses of 
Frasier, Robin, and Glen, given that the question does not make reference to order 
mattering, it is concluded that order does not matter, which, ultimately, grounds 
choosing Jane and her explanation as being correct.   
Considered from within an appeal-to-ignorance framework, the responses from 
Paul, Eddie, Frasier, Robin, and Glen (and the other 8 PSSTs who referenced both 
order and the question in their responses) all note that the question does not provide 
evidence that order matters (i.e., there is no evidence for p) and, as a result, conclude 
that order does not matter (i.e., therefore not-p), which, ultimately, acts as a 
justification for why Jane’s response and her explanation are correct. 
 
6.2. Discussion 
Research into the teaching and learning of probability and probabilistic thinking 
has focused on accounting for normatively incorrect, sometimes inexplicable responses 
to a variety of probabilistic tasks. Stemming from these investigations, a number of 
theories, models and frameworks have been developed to account for and to make 
sense of particular responses. Traditionally, this particular domain of research has 
focused on heuristic and informal reasoning. More recently, an emerging thread of 
research has (re)opened logical fallacies as a fresh perspective to account for certain 
response justifications. While it has been established that the fallacy of composition is 
able to account for incorrect responses to comparisons of relative probability (Chernoff 
E.J. Chernoff, G.L. Russell, I. Vashchyshyn, H. Neufeld, N. Banting 
AIEM, número 11, mayo de 2017   17 
& Russell, 2011a, 2011b, 2012), it had not been determined to what extent logical 
fallacies can account for response justifications to other probabilistic tasks (other than 
relative probability comparisons) and which other fallacies could be utilized. Building 
upon this emerging thread of research, this article has demonstrated that a second 
logical fallacy, namely an appeal to ignorance, is able to account for particular 
responses to probabilistic tasks.  
Speaking more generally, a major purpose of studying teachers’ probabilistic 
knowledge is to better understand how teacher knowledge affects the teaching and 
learning of probability in classrooms. Consider Stohl’s work with probability in 
teacher education, which demonstrates that there are two very important facets to the 
success of a probability curriculum: namely, it relies on a “teachers’ understanding of 
probability as well as a much deeper understanding of issues such as students’ 
misconceptions” (2005, p. 351). This deeper understanding has been referred to as 
knowledge of content and students (KCS), which is built on the teacher’s previous 
experiences with students and informs their future instructional design (Hill, Ball & 
Schilling, 2008). Thus far, the focus of the article has been on providing strong 
evidence for the existence of an appeal to ignorance in pre-service teacher responses to 
certain tasks in probability, but no attempt has yet been made to develop a deeper 
understanding as to why such appeals occur. We now consider two instances. 
Framed using the notion of a sample set (Chernoff & Zazkis, 2011), participants 
who chose Jane’s response began with a legitimate partition of the sample space (as 
the set did indeed list all possible outcomes), which was perhaps naturally suggested 
by the language of the prompt, “…two daughters and one son.” Up until this point, it 
could be argued, then, that they were employing “correct” probabilistic reasoning. The 
participants’ faltered when, rather than asking if each of the outcomes in the sample set 
were equally likely, they used an appeal to ignorance to justify their sample set rather 
than expanding it to the sample space. Their belief that order could be disregarded 
based on a lack of evidence for order mattering ended their trajectory of correct 
probabilistic thinking and resulted in choosing Jane’s response. 
Further, given that Stohl (2005) also claims that teachers lacking knowledge in 
probability content and/or pedagogical content knowledge will likely make mistakes 
similar to those of their students based on beliefs and intuitions, it is interesting 
speculate a re-casting of roles in order to begin to consider why an appeal to ignorance 
appears as a consistent response. This re-casting (very) loosely posits the researcher as 
the classroom teacher (albeit in a very limited role) and the preservice teacher 
participants as students of probability in a typical classroom setting (albeit in a very 
limited role) in which the data was collected. By doing so, speculation based on this 
study, which contained a researcher-preservice teacher dynamic, could then perhaps 
inform a classroom teacher-student dynamic.  
Based on the above comparison, perhaps this article can inform teachers’ 
(researchers’) knowledge of probability by drawing attention to the use of logical 
fallacies (as a new area of investigation for future research on probabilistic thinking, 
the teaching and learning of probability, and teachers’ probabilistic knowledge). 
However, Stohl’s second facet also deserves some attention: How can this study 
contribute to a deeper understanding of how the classroom teacher (researcher) 
understands the cause of students’ (pre-service teachers) misconception of an appeal to 
ignorance? In other words, beyond claiming its existence, it is worthwhile to consider 
the role of a classroom teacher to better inform possible factors supporting the use of 
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an appeal to ignorance as a logical fallacy. 
One possible explanation is based on the work of Konold and colleagues (1993). 
In their work of studying the causes for inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory, 
lines of probabilistic reasoning, they highlight the existence of maxim-like beliefs in 
reasoning around coin-flipping. These maxims often influence decisions in 
probabilistic environments, and can sometimes be found to be held in contradiction to 
one another. The power of these beliefs is so influential that students may hold two 
maxims to be unequivocally true when stated in isolation (e.g. “One cannot predict for 
certain the results of coin flipping,” and “Heads and tails occur about equally often in a 
sample of flips”), and still cling to these ‘truths,’ albeit sometimes begrudgingly, when 
the result of their combination is shown to result in contradictory reasoning (Konold et 
al., 1993, p. 407-408). 
Initially, it may be argued that the participants who chose Jane’s response in 
favour of Dianne’s were following the maxim “All outcomes of an experiment are 
equally likely.” They then generated a list of possible family compositions (with 
regards to gender) and proceeded to treat them all as equally probable because (by the 
students’ reasoning), as with all random events, randomness can only be handled by 
assigning every outcome an equal probability (this line of reasoning was termed the 
“equiprobability bias” by Lecoutre [1992]). The issue with this interpretation is that 
both Jane and Dianne’s solutions present lists of outcomes—one in the form of the 
normative sample space and one as a sample set (Chernoff & Zazkis, 2011)—that are 
presented as being equiprobable. Therefore, if “all outcomes of an experiment are 
equally likely” were the only guiding maxim, it would not lead to choosing one 
response over the other. In other words, the equiprobability bias cannot fully explain 
why some participants chose Jane’s response over Dianne’s. 
Instead of relying on a maxim related the nature of probability, it seems that some 
of the participants who chose Jane’s justification did so because of the way the 
question was constructed. Each of the 21 participant responses that were the impetus 
for this article explicitly referenced the information, or lack thereof, in the question. 
The language of their responses (e.g. “it didn’t specifically say that order mattered,” 
and “the question doesn’t mention birth order and therefore there is no need to 
consider that”) signals that they may be acting according to a social maxim (Yackel & 
Cobb, 1996; Yackel, Rasmussen, & King, 2000) regarding the nature of all questions 
in probability, which can be stated as “A question must contain all pertinent 
information to arrive at a correct solution.” In other words, their mathematical action 
is justified by the ultimate authority of the question. We term this the explicitness 
maxim. It falls outside the realm of maxims describing the mathematics of the task, but 
rather speaks to the sociomathematical sphere in which tasks are encountered.  
It is likely that this neat and tidy perception of the probability task comes from the 
PSST and PEST’s experiences with probability in classrooms. While the study of 
probability contains ample opportunity for the experimental, this branch is often 
avoided in favour of the classical, normative approach based on counting principles—
theoretical probability. It is not a surprise that teachers favour this classical approach. 
It is accessible through counting techniques and algorithms, leads to a single answer, 
and somehow “avoids a realistic interpretation of that value” (Stohl, 2005, p. 347). 
(Certainly, the value attributed to various methods also depends on the aim of 
teaching—conceptual progress or numerical progress [Borovcnik, 2012]—, and it may 
be argued that the classical approach favors the latter.) This is the social paradigm 
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from which probability questions emerge. Classical probability treats problems in a 
theoretical space where necessary information such as sample space, favourable 
outcomes, and existence of order are either systematically calculated or explicitly 
stated. An explicitness maxim easily gains influence in this culture. Without an explicit 
reference to attending to order, the social norm is maintained by assuming that no 
mention of order (no evidence for p) means that order doesn’t matter (therefore not-p). 
It is so powerful that it is offered as the only discernable difference between the 
responses of Jane and Dianne. Worthy of note, the computational and procedural (i.e., 
classical) approach of teaching probability has been found to be more prevalent among 
secondary teachers as compared to primary teachers (Stohl, 2005), and the notion of 
order is a key concept underlying the counting techniques of this classical probability. 
In particular, the route to a correct solution often lies in the answer to the question, 
“Does order matter?” It is interesting to note that these findings are echoed in the 
results of this study, where of the 23 PESTs that chose Jane’s response, 15 (65%) 
referenced order in the justifications and, of the 32 PSSTs that chose Jane’s response, 
30 (94%) referenced order in the justifications while just 2 (6%) did not reference 
order in their justifications.  
In an attempt to better understand the misconceptions of students rather than to 
simply categorize their existence, the explicitness maxim is offered as an explanatory 
classroom edict developed through experience with probability questions. It seems that 
given the overwhelming prevalence of the normative or classical notion of probability 
that dominates mathematics classrooms, and thus students’ encounters with 
probabilistic reasoning, an appeal to ignorance may be “neither a reflection of basic 
deficits in logical reasoning not a result of simple carelessness” (Konold et al., 1993, p. 
411). In other words, it may, in some sense, be logical. In short, it seems that the 
structure of school mathematics class may perpetrate the fallacy, but more research 
will determine to what extent logical fallacies—such as the fallacy of composition and 
an appeal to ignorance—play a part in teachers’ and students’ knowledge of 
probability, and what factors (both mathematical and social) contribute to their use. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
As demonstrated in the analysis of results, all 10 responses that were analyzed can 
be framed within the logical fallacy know as an appeal to ignorance. More specifically, 
all 10 responses made reference, whether implicitly or explicitly, to the question not 
“stating,” “asking,” “indicating,” or “declaring” that order matters (i.e., there is no 
evidence for p) and, as such, the responses concluded that the order (of the outcomes) 
does not matter (i.e., therefore not-p), which was represented differently by different 
individuals and which led, ultimately, to their decision to choose Jane’s response and 
explanation.  
Although only 10 responses were presented in the analysis of results, we note, 
based upon the striking similarities between the 10 responses presented and the 11 
responses not presented, that the logical fallacy, known as an appeal to ignorance, 
accounts for 100% (21/21) of the participants whose responses referenced both order 
and the question, which also represents, concurrently, 47% (21/45) of the responses 
who chose Jane’s response and referenced order in their justifications, 38% (21/55) of 
those responses who chose Jane’s response, and 16% (21/130) of all the participants 
involved in the current research. 
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Within the limited field of research on teachers’ probabilistic knowledge, incorrect, 
inconsistent and inexplicable responses to probabilistic tasks are most often accounted 
for by utilizing theories, frameworks and models that are based upon heuristic and 
informal reasoning, such as the representativeness heuristic, the equiprobability bias, 
the outcome approach, and others. More recently, new research based upon logical 
fallacies has been proving effective in explaining certain normatively incorrect 
responses to probabilistic tasks. However, while it has been established that the fallacy 
of composition is able to account for certain incorrect responses to comparisons of 
relative probability, it had not been determined to what extent logical fallacies can 
account for responses to other probabilistic tasks and which other fallacies could be 
utilized. This article contributes to this emerging area of research by demonstrating 
how a second logical fallacy, known as “an appeal to ignorance,” can be used to 
account for a specific set of normatively incorrect responses provided by prospective 
elementary and secondary mathematics teachers to a new probabilistic task.   
In particular, a group (n = 130) of prospective elementary and secondary school 
teachers were asked to determine and justify, via written response, which of two 
student responses provided the correct answer and explanation to a question that 
involved determining the probability that a three-child family has two daughters and 
one son, an alteration to a task recently introduced to the research literature. In this 
new version of the task, altered with the goal of contributing to the research on 
teachers’ probabilistic knowledge, the focus is not on evaluating the prospective 
teachers’ pedagogical responses, but rather on which response they deem to be 
mathematically correct.  
It was found that 49% of the prospective teachers chose the incorrect student response, 
with little difference between the percentage of prospective secondary and prospective 
elementary school teachers that chose this response. The analysis, however, focuses on 
21 responses referencing both order and the given question in their justifications. In 
particular, these participants reason that, given that the question does not explicitly 
“state,” “indicate,” or “declare” that birth order matters in this task, birth order is not 
relevant to the situation. It is demonstrated that logically fallacious reasoning—more 
specifically, an appeal to ignorance (there is no evidence for proposition p; therefore, 
not-p)—accounts for these normatively incorrect responses to the task.  
In addition to demonstrating the use of the appeal to ignorance fallacy by prospective 
mathematics teachers, the article also explores possible factors supporting and 
perpetuating its use. In particular, and in line with previous research on the existence 
of maxim-like beliefs related to probabilistic situations, it is suggested that individuals 
employing this fallacy are following a belief that is termed the explicitness maxim, 
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whereby it is assumed that a question must contain all pertinent information to arrive at 
a correct solution. It is further proposed that this maxim reflects the sociomathematical 
sphere in which probabilistic tasks are encountered, and in particular, that a focus on 
the classical approach to teaching theoretical probability may contribute to the use of 
this particular logical fallacy.  
